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ABSTRACT
Grice (1990), in his Cooperative Principle, proposes
that speakers engaged in discourse may assume mutually
cooperative truth.

Yet, in daily discourse, we observe

occasions in which speakers of English seemingly attempt to
avoid absolute commitment to the propositional truth in
their speech.

In this context, I propose that speakers of

English intend to avoid absolute commitment through their
use of modality.
After defining speaker commitment as it pertains to
propositional truth in speech acts and exploring influences·
and motivations that may affect speaker commitment, this
thesis will introduce and define modality in the context of
actual speech.

The scope of modality will then be narrowed

to a focus on core and periphrastic modals.

Specifically,

discussion of these modals will include their
identification and meanings/functions.

Finally, a survey

. of commitment and truth in commo·n modal usage will be
presented.

The survey's findings will particularly address

the following questions:

Do speakers express absolute

commitment through modal usage?

What modals do speakers

perceive to convey the strongest and weakest

iii

degrees/meanings of commitment?

Do speakers prefer the

directness of the positive assertion can or the distant,
albeit polite form could when speaking commitment?

Does

the usage of can versus could change the degree/meaning of
commitment in speech?

How do speakers' perceptions of

commitment through the use of the modal will relate to
relationships between speakers and hearers?

Are age,

gender, native language, and/or occupation relational to
the degree and/or propositional truth of commitment in
speech?

Is the speaker's perception of his/her level of

commitments consistent with or variant to the speaker's
reported actual keeping of commitments?

Lastly, is the

phrasal modal need to spoken consistently in daily
discourse to mean literally necessity?

Following survey

Findings and Summary, a Discussion of General and Teaching
~

English as a Second Language implications is presented.
Key words: commitment, modality, relationship, gender, age,
native language, and statistics.
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CHAPTER ONE
COMMITMENT IN SPEECH ACTS

When we speak or write, we are rarely
very clear, precise, or explicit about
what we mea~.but are, on the contrary,
vague,
indirect,
and unclear
about
just
what
we
are
committed
to.
(Stubbs, 1986, p.1)

Introduction
The axiom "A man is as good as his word" and the
Biblical admonition "Let your yea be yea, and your nea,
nea" (James 5:12) traditionally have been common principles
governing daily English conversation.

Accordingly, Grice

(1990), in his Cooperative Principle, proposes that
speakers engaged in discourse may assume mutually
cooperative truth. Yet, in daily discourse, we observe
occasions in which speakers of English seemingly attempt to
avoid absolute commitment to the propositional truth in
their speech.

Consider the following examples of actual

speech. On December 12, 2001 (5:00 PM), Peter Jennings
presaged his evening topic for ABC's World News Tonight,
"Tanzanite, the popular gem that may be funding terrorism."
Effectively, Jennings implies to his audience a plausible
link between tanzanite and terrorism without committing
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himself to the truth of an actual link. Similarly, in a
conversation between two musicians, Musician A apprises her
colleague (B), "Practice is Saturday morning at 9:00, but
don't quote me." Thus, Musician A overtly states that
practice is scheduled for 9:00 AM, while seemingly
attempting to elude commitment to the truth of a 9:00 AM
practice by adding to her statement "but don't quote me."
In yet a third example, a middle-aged lady ·(c) tells a
friend, "I will be there (a friend's birthday
celebr~tion) ."

Not long after,

(C) tells a co-worker that

she will be going to the birthday party (referenced above)
unless she can get tickets to a concert, which is the same
night as the party.

Upon contemplation of these given

examples, I set forth two questions: if, as in the first
two examples, we as speakers of English (SsE)

circumvent

commitment to propositional truth in our speech, do we
genuinely practice speaking cooperatively in mutual
commitment to trvth?

Further, if, as in the third example,

we speak commitment, but do not intend commitment, do we
subtly lie?
In this context, I propose that speakers of English
intend to avoid absolute commitment in their use of

modality.

Further, 1) I will specifically demonstrate that
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speakers of English use will, the modal to which "absolute
commitment" is ascribed in linguistic theory, for an
intended meaning of relative commitment; moreover,
sociocultural variables such as speaker-addressee
relationship and age significantly impact speaker
commitment in his/her speech acts.

2)

I will investigate

how speakers apply modality in order to distance themselves
from an absolute commitment to the verity of their speech.
Within this first chapter, I will def_in~ speaker
commitment as it directly relates to propositional
truthfulness in speech acts and progress to a discussion of
pragmatic and sociolinguistic factors that may influence a
speaker's commitment in his/her speech acts.
In chapter 2, modality will be introduced and defined
in the context of actual speech surrounding the 2000
Presidential Election.

The scope of modality will then be

narrowed to the identification and function/meaning of core
and periphrastic modals.

The discussion will present

current grammar and research theory that asserts absolute
poles of commitment in modal usage.
Chapter 3 will present the results of a survey of
commitment and truth in common modal usage obtained by
sampling in a variety of contexts will be presented.
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The

survey's findings will particularly address the following
questions:
modal usage?

Do speakers express absolute commitment through
What modals do speakers perceive to convey

the strongest and weakest degrees/meanings of commitment?
Do speakers prefer the directness of the positive assertion
can or the distant, albeit polite form could when speaking

commitment?

Does the usage of can versus could change the

degree/meaning of commitment in speech?

How do speakers'

perceptions of commitment through the use of the modal will
relate to relationships between speakers and hearers?

Are

age, gender, native language, and/or occupation relational
to the degree and/or propositional truth of commitment in
speech?

Are speakers' perceptions of their level of

commitments consistent with or variant to their reported
actual keeping of commitments?

Secondarily, to investigate

propositional truth in modal usage, I ask, is the phrasal
modal need to spoken consistently in daily discourse to
mean literally necessity?

Commitment
A discussion of commitment in speech acts would be
remiss without careful definition and pragmatic examination
of commitment as it pertains to propositional truthfulness
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in speech acts.
the following:

Therefore, I posit and strive to answer
What is commitment?

commitment in speech acts?

What constitutes

What pragmatic and

sociolinguistic factors influence a speaker's commitment to
truth in his/her speech?

Webster's New Collegiate

Dictionary (1959) defines commitment as "a promise or
pledge" (p. 166). The American Heritage Dictionary (1997)
further explicates that commitment, in addition to a
pledge, is "the state of being bound emotionally or
intellectually... "
Thesaurus

(p. 281).

Moreover, Webster's Collegiate

(1988) assigns "obligation" (p. 141) as the

primary synonym to commitment. Thus, by definition,
commitment includes a promise or pledge, and as such, is
binding as an obligation. Further, commitment, as a
promise, "gi~es to the person to whom it is made a right to
expect or to claim" that which is promised (Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary, 1959, p. 676).

By extending this

definition into speech act theory, I submit that speaker
commitment may be defined as a speaker's promise to the

propositional truth of his/her utterance, the promise to
which the speaker is emotionally or intellectually bound
and obligated in his/her speech.

Thereby, the addressee

expects or claims that the proposition(s) of the speaker's
5

utterance(s)

is true.

Comparatively, Grice (1990) proposes

that rational conversation requires three cooperative
elements:

co-operative effort(s), common purpose(s), and

mutually accepted direction between speaker(s) and
hearer(s)

(p. 27).

Under the umb_rella of this· Co-operative

Principle, Grice, moreover, asserts a maxim of Quality,

"Try to make your contribution one that is true...Do not say
what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for
which you lack adequate evidence" (p. 28). Thus, co
operative speakers of English engaged in rational
conversation expect mutually co-operative truth; i.e.,
speaker commitment to the propositional truth in his/her
speech.

In stark contrast, Aristotle defines the

antithesis of commitment to truth, i.e., a lie, as "a
statement of that which is that it is not, or of that which
is not that it is" (Washington, 1991, p. 28).

Citing Frege

(1981), Lyon observes diametric.antagonists, truth versus
lies, in daily conversation and asserts that our words and
sentences relate "to truth or falsity,

rather than to

situations that they purport to describe" (p. 161).
Further, Lyon (1981) writes that commitment is "a modal
component of factuality versus desirability"

(p. 191).

However, in pragmatic observation of daily conversation, is

6

speaker commitment merely an utterance of truth or falsity?
Factuality or desirability?

What constitutes speaker

commitment in our speech acts?
Speaker commitment may be expressed through two
primary means.

First, and most obviously, speaker

commitment may be expressed through the illocutiona_ry act
of making a promise.
act?

How does a speaker accomplish. this

Searle (1965) posits that all speech acts are

governed by constitutive and regulative rules. The former
is a system of semantic rules under which speech acts are
performed in the form of "If

Xr

then y;" the latter,

resembling the equation "X counts as y," regulates existing
forms of behavior and interpersonal relationships

(p. 117)

The speech act of making a promise creates an obligation
under regulative rules in the form of X counts as y, i.e.,
certain conditions must obtain.

Searle proposes the

following requisites for making a sincere promise.
1. Input and Output.

"Normal input and output

conditions obtainff (p. 121), i.e., the utterance must

be intelligible speaker output and understood hearer
input.
2. Propositional Content. "S (the speaker)
that p

expresses

(the proposition) in the utterance of T (the
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sentence)," and "in expressing that p, S predicates a

future act A of S" (p. 121).
"H (the hearer)

3. Preparatory Conditions.

would

prefer S's doing A to his not doing A, and S believes
H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A.
Additionally,

"It is not obvious to both S and H that

Swill do A in the normal course of events"
4. Sincerity Condition.

"S intends to do A"

(p. 122).

(p.

123) .

5. Essential Condition.

"S intends that the utterance

of Twill place him under an obligation to do A"

(p.

123) .

"S intends that the utterance of T

6. Explication.

will produce in Ha belief that conditions (sincerity
and essential)

obtain by means of the recognition of

the intention to produce that belief, and he intends
this recognition to be achieved by means of the
recognition of the sentence as one conventionally used
to preface such beliefs"
7. Semantic Rules.

(p. 123).

"The semantical rules of the

dialect spoken by Sand Hare such that Tis correctly
and sincerely uttered i f and only i f (all previous)
conditions obtain

(p. 123).
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Of the afore conditions, condition #4 qualifies such
promises as sincere.

However, we observe in daily English

conversation occasions in which an insincere promise is
uttered, i.e., the speaker does not intend to do A.

For

example, S affirms to H, "I promise I will be there (H's
party) tomorrow," although, S has other plans and does not
intend to go to the party.

In such occurrences, does S's

insincerity void the uttered commitment?

It does not.

In addition to the act of making a sincere promise,
speakers of English also make a promise or commitment to
the truth of their speech by the mere utterance of their
words, regardless of the speaker's sincerity or
insincerity, i.e., the very illocution of an utterance
obligates the speaker to his/her speech (exception: irony,
implicature, sarcasm, metaphors, and the like-See Grice,
1990).

Searle (1965) asserts:

To say "I promise to do A~ is to take responsibility
for intending to do A, and this condition holqs
whether the utterance was sincere or insincere (p.
124) .

Stubbs

(1986; cf. Kempson 1977) likewise writes,

Performatives (e.g. I promise, I guarantee)

can be

analyzed naturally as reporting propositions, which
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are true by virtue of being uttered.

If I say that I

have promised, even if I have no intention of keeping
my promise: the commitment has been made (p. 18).
Moreover, Grice's Co-operative Principle and maxim of
Quality may be extended such that the theory of a speaker's
obligation to the truth of his/her speech by mere utterance
applies not only to performative speech acts, but to non
performative speech acts as well; if I say that pis or is
not, even if I do not believe that it is or is not, I have
verbally made a commitment to the propositional truth in my
speech by virtue of its utterance.
1)

I promise I will come.

2)

I will come.

Consider the following:

3) I promise the package was mailed yesterday.
4) The package was mailed yesterday.
5)

I guarantee rehearsal is at 8:00 PM.

6) Rehearsal is at 8:00 PM.
Although the illocutionary force, by use of performatives
in sentences #1, 3, and 5 above, is stronger than that of
sentences #2, 4, and 6; under the Co-operative Principle
and the maxim of Quality, the speaker is obligated to utter
only that which he/she believes to be true and the hearer
expects that the speaker's utterance is true in all six
10

examples, regardless whether the speaker utters
performative or non-performative verbs.

Thus, we observe

that the act of mere utterance obligates, or promises, the
speaker's commitment to his/her speech.

Further, drawing

upon Searle, I submit that when a speaker utters T
containing that p, and thereby promises to the truth of the
speech act, the following conditions obtain regulatively in
the form of X counts as y.
1. Input and Output.

"Normal input and output conditions

obtain" (Searle, 1965, p. 121), i.e., the utterance is
intelligible speaker output and understood hearer
input.
2. Propositional Content.
that p

"S (the speaker)

expresses

(the proposition) in the utterance of T (the

sentence) , " and "in expressing that p, S predicates... "

p

(Searle, 1965, p. 121).

3. Preparatory Condition.

H does not have reason to

believe that Sis speaking uncooperatively or
untruthfully.
4. Sincerity Condition.

S does not intend that p to be

implicature, figure of speech, · indir.ect speech, or the
like.
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5. Essential Condition.

Under the maxim of Quality, S's

utterance of that pin T obligates S to the truth of
his/her speech, regardless whether S intends that pas
truth or not.
6. Explication.

S utters that pin T; such utterance of

T produces in H the belief that S intends his/her
speech to be cooperative and truthful, and therefore,
also produces in H the belief that Sis committed to
the truth of his/her speech. S's utterance Tis a
sentence conventionally used to convey T as truth,
thereby leading H to expect S's utterance to be true.
7. Semantic Rules.

The semantic rules of the language or

dialect spoken by Sand Hare such that T uttered is a
speaker's promise to the truth of T if the previous
conditions obtain.
Thus, in accordance with the Co-operative Principle,
its supermaxims, and regulative rules which govern speech
acts, I conclude that a speaker of English pledges
commitment through two observed means: 1) 'the
performative act of making a promise and 2) the mere
utterance of non-performative T that P.

Reciprocally,

the addressee expects spe.aker commitment when either
illocutor mean has been uttered.
12

Influences and Motivations
Having defined speaker commitment as it pertains to
propositional truth, and having examined the conditions
that constitute such commitment, we turn our attention to
explore influences and motivations that may be related to
speaker commitment in our speech acts. Sociolinguistically,
why might speakers endeavor to circumvent commitment in
their speech and to its truth?

Pragmatically, upon what

occasion(s) and under what circumstance(s) do illocutors
intend to elude speaker commitment?
or gained when

ct

·what might be achieved

speaker avoids commitment in his/her

speech?
First, the compelling consideration of politeness may
be observed in daily English conversation.

Chen (2001)

proposes, "Politeness is a factor that determines what a
speaker says and how she says it" (p. 95). Moreover, Brown
and Levinson (1987), assert that speakers employ
"linguistic stLategies" to "face-oriented ends," i.e.,
politeness

(p. 58).

Of politeness, Leech (1983) posits two forms of
illocution: self-politeness (a speaker's politeness toward
himself/herself) and other-politeness (a speaker's
politeness toward the hearer).
13

Additionally, the theorist

notes that politeness may be expressed toward a third party
(present or absent)

as an extension of self or other.

Whether the third party is perceived as an extension of

self or other is culturally relative; i.e., constrained by
cultural expectations and norms of language.

Moreover,

cultural expectations influence the manner of expressing
politeness, including esteem versus denigration.

For

example, an English-speaking host may graciously accept a
compliment on a deliciously cooked meal with a "Thank You."
However, a Chinese Mandarin speaking host must not only
humbly decline the compliment, but also demonstrate

politeness by denigrating the quality of the meal (viewed
culturally as an extension of self) with a response such as

It's not so good or It's nothing.

In this case, the latter

host may or may not be committed to his/her speech of
politeness, inwardly knowing that a very generous,
extraordinarily delicious meal indeed was served and being
..

most appreciative of the compliment.
Contemporary with Leech, Brown and Levinson (1987)
observe that politeness is contingent upon two elements:

rationality and face,
face of the hearer.

specifically other-face, i.e., the

Rationality is defined as that

"precisely definable mode of reasoning from ends to the
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means that will achieve those ends" (p. 58).

Face relates

both to the positive desire of a person to be accepted and
approved of in specific communicative, social situations as
well as to a person's negative desire to be unimpeded,
which includes "the basic claim to territories, personal
preserves, rights to non-distraction -

i.e., to freedom of

action and freedom from imposition" (p. 61).
Brown and Levinson emphasize:

Moreover,

"Face is something that is

emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or
enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in
interaction"

(p. 61) .

Thus,

face is an "high stakes"

politeness component, which greatly influences the content
of a speaker's utterance as well as the manner in which
propositional content is illocuted, including commitment
versus non-commitment.
However, in daily conversation,.
we frequently ·observe
,. '
occasions in which a speaker imposes upon his/her hearer's
face by uttering a Face-Threatening Act (FTA).

For

example, a family member's car is in the shop.

I live

nearby; consequently, this family member asks,

Would you give me a ride to work tomorrow morning?
Her request, though seemingly reasonable, imposes her
desire or need upon me, thereby threatening my negative
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face and potentially impeding my plan to leave early in the
morning for San Diego.
In addition to a speaker's having potential to
threaten the face of the hearer (other-face), Chen (2001)
observes that the reciprocal also holds true, i.e. the
hearer potentially can threaten the face of the speaker or
self-face can be threatened.

Thus, Chen proposes

(in

polite modesty), an essential complement to Levinson and
Brown's other-politeness, the theory of self-politeness:
"When having to do speech acts that threaten self-face or
when self-face is attacked by others, speakers will make
efforts to maintain, protect, or enhance self-face,
resulting in utterances for the sake of self-politeness."
(p. 90)

In this context, self is defined as the speaker and

those with whom the speaker is associated.

[e.g., A

teacher is one entity among the plurality of aids, fellow
colleagues, and administrators of a learning institution;
therefore, a teacher's associates and colleagues, as well
as the institution itself, may be included in that
teacher's concept of "self."]

_Speech acts that threaten

self-face (positive or negative) are known as Self-Face
Threatening Acts (SFTA's).

Consider the following example.

A high school principal asks,
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Will you (an English teacher) consider giving extra
time after school next semester to tutor students in
English and math?
However, the teacher has been looking forward to taking
piano lessons during that time.

A response in the

negative, i.e., I do not agree to commit, would be
potentially self-face threatening; for it might contribute·
to the principal's perceiving the teacher as being non
cooperative or a non-team player (positive self-face
threatening).

On the other hand, an utterance to commit to

tutoring after school would require that the teacher give
up treasured personal time and plans to study music
(negative self-face threatening).
To further explicate their politeness theories, Brown
and Levinson (1987, p.60) and Chen (2001, p.96) assert that
speakers employ superstrategies of politeness to determine
1) whether or not they will utter a face-threatening act at
all, and if so, 2) the content and manner in which they
will illocute the speech act.

Table 1.1 below explicates.

17

Tab·le 1.1.

Politeness Superstrategies

Brown and Levinson

Chen

(Relevance: S asks H for
commitment in speech act.)

(Relevance: S makes a choice:
to commit or not in speech act.)

Less Face Threat
1. Baldly. Without redress.
On record.
2. Positive politeness.
With redress. On record.
3. Negative politeness.
With redress. On record.
4. Off record.
5. Withhold FTA.
Great Face Threat

Less Face Threat
1. Baldly. Without redress.
On record.
2. *With redress. On record.

3. Off record.
4. Withhold SFTA.
Great Face Threat

Superstrategy determined by·
Superstrategy determined by
estimation of:
estimation of:
1. Degree self-face is threa~ened
1. The want to communicate the
by other.
content of FTA x.
A. Degree of confrontation
2. The want to be efficient/urgent.
3. The want to maintain Hearer's
(continuum) .
face to any degree.
B. Gravity of FTA threat by
other.
(Brown and Levinson, 1987)
1) FTA Severity.
2) FTA Directness.
2. Degree self-face threatened by
SFTA.
A. SFTA Severity.
B. SFTA Consequence.
(Chen, 2001)
(*Chen does not distinguish between negative and positive face, a
distinction of kind, rather than degree. Additionally, Chen notes that
negative and positive face apply to all superstrategies whether on or
off record. )

In Table 1.1 above, we observe that the superstrategies for
other and self-politeness are complementary.

In situations

which speakers perceive to be non-confrontational or
minimally consequential, speakers may choose to utter
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"baldly" FTA's or SFTA's; e.g. a congenial, "Excuse me,"
(SFTA) or a simple request/reply:
A:

When you get a moment, could you lend me a quick
hand?

B:

(FTA)

I'd be happy to.

(SFTA)

From·the latter example, we note specifically that B's
speech act is a baldly uttered commitment to help A.
In a situation of slightly increased potential for
face threat, speakers may choose to utter FTA's or SFTA's
"with redress" in an attempt to mitigate unfavorable and
unwanted positive or negative-face results.

Chen suggests

that such redress may include, but not be limited to, the
following:

justification, contradiction, hedging,

impersonalization, humor, confident speech, modest speech,
hesitance, or conditions appended to the SFTA to the
utterance (p. 99).

[Note:

may apply to an FTA.]

All but direct contradiction

Specific to SFTA's, Chen notes that

the first five speaker options (justification,
contradiction, hedging, impersonalization, and humor) are
positive strategies employed usually when a speaker has
acted thoughtlessly or committed a faux pas. In such
utterances a speaker will admit to the offence, adding to
the admission justification, a humorous remark, etc. When
19

needing to portray a strong, capable self-image, such as at
a job interview, the speaker attempts to use speech that
suggests self-confidence. On the other hand, a speaker who
does not want to seem arrogant (which also might be
perceived as a threat to other--a potential for other
attack against self) may choose to modestly minimize
himself/herself.

Hesitation and conditional addendums are

negative strategies used by a speaker (self) when other
imposes upon self, such that self would potentially lose
self-face or realize unfavorable consequences should self
not agree to the imposition, e.g. a university
administrator strongly urges a professor of English to
speak at a CATESOL conference forum, rather than to attend
a long anticipated L.A. Laker's game.

In r.esponse, the

professor may hedge or hesitate to commit to speaking at
the conference, or the professor may commit on the
condition "If my job depends on it, I will do it" or "Only
if no one else is available will I do it."
Of particular relevance to the present thesis, each of
the previous nine options of Chen's second superstrategy
are particularly applicable to commitment in speech acts.
The following examples illustrate.
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Justification:

We're sorry that it's taking a
little longer than expected.

We

will have it finished by 5:00;
we've just been swamped today.
Contradiction:

I said that I would go, but I
really didn't commit to it.

Hedge:

We will probably go to the game.

Impersonalization:

Boss:

Will you please see that
this project gets done
correctly?

Employee: It will be tough to meet
these specifications.
Humor:

Supervisor: Can you fix it?
Worker:

Did Greenbay win the
Superbowl?

Confidence:

I will take care of the matter; I
know the client well.

Modesty:

Student:

I don't understand
this concept.
Can you help me?

Tutor:

I might know a little
about it.
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I have a 9:00 and a 10:00

Hesitation:

(appointment); I'll see if I can
swing by about 11:30.
Parent:

Conditions:

It's time to do your
homework.

Child:

I'll do it only because
I have to.

Upon occasions in which the threat to face is high,
speakers may opt to employ a third super strategy, that is,
to utter FTA's or SFTA's "off-record" or to be elusive onrecord. As a primary means of doing so, Chen asserts that
speakers strive to implement implicature and other implied
speech, flouting Grice's maxims of Quantity, Quality,
Relation, and/or Manner.
obvious:

The purpose, Chen writes, "is

by doing the SFTA at the what-is-implied level

rather than at the what-is-said level, the speaker would
avoid damaging self-face" (p. 101).
Additionally, as the degree of threat to face
increases, I propose that speakers specifically use
modality as a means to circumvent commitment in their
implied speech.

Peter Jennings' statement, "Tanzanite, the

popular gem that may be funding terrorism,"

(quoted in this

paper's opening paragraph) illustrates well Chen's argument
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of elusiveness and the use of modality to achieve that end.
As a journalist, Jennings is cognizant that he and his
television network (self)

are liable for the accuracy or

inaccuracy of his statement(s).

Moreover, being on-record

and not desiring to lose face for violating the maxim of
Quality (i.e., stating as fact that for which one lacks
sufficient evidence to declare to be true), Jennings
chooses to distance himself from the truth of his
proposition by using the modal may rather than baldly
committing, ~Tanzanite, the popular gem that is funding
terrorism."

Thus, Jennings 1) effectively proposes by

implication, through the use of modality, a link between
tanzanite and terrorism, 2) escapes accountability for the
truthfulness of his proposition, and thereby, 3) preserves
self-face, i.e., precludes or mitigates other attack

against self.

In sum, following a non-commital politeness

superstrategy was less self-face threatening than absolute
commitment in his speech.
When estimating the weightiness of an FTA, Brown and
Levinson suggest that the speaker factors three
sociological variables: social distance, relative power,
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and the ranking of impositions in the particular culture
expressed through the following formula:
Wx=D(S,H)+P(H,S)+Rx.
In other words, the weight of the face-threatening act x
equals the social distance (D) of the speaker (S) to the
hearer (H), plus the relative power (P) of the hearer over
the speaker, plus the absolute ranking (R) of impositions
in the particular culture.

In this equation, social

distance is a non-power, horizontal measurement of
speaker/hearer identity and relationship (friend/friend,
acquaintance/acquaintance, colleague/colleague,
parent/parent, etc.), whereas relative power indicates the
vertical or hierarchical role value of one participant over
the other (captain/private, employer/employee,
parent/child, teacher/student, etc.).

Additionally, the

appropriateness of a speech act according to cultural
expectations for a particular office/occupation, age,
gender, expertise, etc., is calculated as Rx.
While we observe that the collective ·addends of the
previous equation influence politeness, and thus
commitment, in our speech acts, can we also say that each
addend independently influences commitment in our speech?
Further, if one or more do independently affect commitment
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in our speech, do they affect commitment equally or
disproportionately?
As a horizontal measurement of speaker/hearer
relationship, social distance is a non-power continuum of
interactive symmetry.

Brown and Levinson assert that this

measurement of symmetrical likenesses and/or contrasts is
calculated according to "frequency of interaction" and "the
kinds of material or non-material goods

(including face)

exchanged between Sand H" (p. 77). On one end of the
spectrum is greater social distance that includes
speaker/hearer relationships having the least frequency of
interaction and the greatest contrast of exchanged goods
(such as might occur between speakers with contrastive
dialects, ethnic values, ages, occupations, etc.)

At the

opposite end of the continuum, social closeness,
speaker/hearer relationships have the greatest commonality
and frequency of exchanges.

"The reflex of social

closeness," Brown and Levinson propose, "is, generally, the
giving and receiving of positive face"

(p. 77). By applying

the previous reflex principle to commitment in our speech
(with deference to Chen's unification of positive and
negative face superstrategies), I propose that speakers of
greater social distance will tend to utter greater positive

25

and negative SFTA's, taking wide latitude to avoid (even
not to keep)

absolute commitment.

In contrast, speakers of

strong social propinquity will tend to utter (and to keep)
commitment to other as a face-giving reflex.

For example,

upon my best friend's request, I would be inclined to utter
absolute commitment, whereas upon the request of an
acquaintance, I might have greater tendency to decline
commitment, either baldly or with redress.

Thus, I

hypothesize that social distance, or horizontal
relationship, does independently influence commitment in
our speech.
In addition to horizontal relationships, we also
observe vertical, or power relationships between
interlocuters (Brown and Levinson's second addend, P).
These asymmetrical relationships are based upon "material
control (over economic distribution and physical force)"
and "metaphysical control (over the actions of others, by
virtue of metaphysical forces subscribed to by those
others)" (p. 77), whether sanctioned or unsanctioned,
intersecting or non-intersecting.

Accordingly, Scollon and

Scollon (1981) refer to power manifestations among speakers
as "superordinate" over "subordinate" roles in the
presentation of self [e.g., elder over younger, teqcher
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over student, employer over employee, husband over wife
(traditionally), parent over child, etc.] Moreover, Scollon
and Scollon assert that the superordinate role entails
dominance and spectatorship of the subordinate, whereas the
expectation of the subordinate role is exhibitionism and
dependence.

Therefore, "as S's power over H increases, the

weightiness of (an)
p. 78).

FTA diminishes"

(Brown and Levinson,

For as the speaker or superordinate's power·

increases over the subordinate hearer, so does the·
dominant's imposition upon and expectation from the hearer,
e.g. employer/employee relationship.
Building upon the preceding foundation,

I propose that

as the power of the speaker (superordinate) over the hearer
(subordinate)

increases, so does the weightiness of the

SFTA to the hearer.

Of application to commitment in our

speech, I hypothesize the following: as the power of the
speaker requesting commitment increases over the hearer,
the greater the hearer will tend to make (and to keep)
absolute commitment.

Conversely, however, I ask: would the

superordinate's-commitment toward the subordinate be the
same?

If not, how would commitment vary?
Thirdly, Brown and Levinson's politeness equation

includes the element of cultural significance in our
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speech.

Hudson (1996) asserts a merger between "language"

and "social constraints on speech" (p. 108).

Moreover, he

maintains,
Society controls our speech in two ways.

Firstly, by

Secondly, society

providing a set of norms.

provides the motivation for adhering to these
norms . . . In addition to controlling it in these two
ways, society takes a great interest in speech, and in
particular provides a set of concepts for thinking and
talking about it (pp. 119-120).
Specific to commitment in our speech, cultural norms, as
referred to by Hudson, constrain explicitness in language.
For example, Keenan (1974) observes intentional ambiguity
as a norm in Malagasy society.

New information is

perceived as a peculiar treasure, giving prestige to the
person who solely possesses it.

Thus, specific information

generally is not provided upon request; rather, an elusive
response is the norm.

Further, the uttering of specific

identities and references is believed to bring bad omen
upon that which is specified and "tsiny" guilt upon the
speaker.

The consequence of this belief upon Malagasy

explicitness is three fold.

First, Malagasy speakers avoid

addressing persons and identifying sources by given name.
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Second, speakers hesitate to talk specifically about past
events.

Third, speakers are extremely reluctant to utter

future commitments.

In sum, Keenan's research suggests

that Malagasy speakers seemingly prefer to use non
committal speech.
Similarly, Scollon and Scollon (1981) observe
contrasts between American English and Athabaskan speakers.
The researchers report that whereas explicitness and
commitment to past and future events is culturally
appropriate among American English speakers, Athabaskan
speech reflects the practice of a Reduction Principle,
i.e., the reduction of self.

Thereby, Athabaskan speakers

perceive illocutions that directly state or commit to
future events to be culturally unacceptable, bringing "bad
luck".

Specific favorable recounting of past events is

also avoided.
Thus, in light of the previous Malagasy and Athabaskan
linguistic contrasts to English discourse and given that
language acquisition theory affirms :the phenomenon of first
language transfer into second languages (Gass
2001),

&

Selinker,

I hypothesize that native language influences

speaker commitment among English speakers.
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Finally, the merger of cultural constraints and
language (Hudson, 1996, previously cited) also imposes
expectations of gender in language.

Hudson writes, "As far

as speakers are concerned, the commonest characteristics to
be reflected by specific linguistic items is sex" (p. 121).
Further, he asserts that male speakers are oriented toward
power.

In contrast, female speakers are solidarity

purposed.

Interestingly, the researcher considers the

motivation of power to disadvantage the male speaker in the
home where "rapport-speaking" is key to private family
relationships, and perceives the solidarity motivation of
the female speaker to be disadvantageous in the workplace
wherein oral presentations and committee deliberations are
required.

Accordingly, Coates (1986) asserts that men and

women "differ... in their sense of what is appropriate for
them as speakers" (p. 123).

Citing Lakoff (1975),_ she

additionally states, "Women are perceived as expressing
themselves in a more tentative way .than men," i.e. less
committal (P. 103).
However, the "tentativeness" of female speech in
sociolinguistic theory is highly controversial. O'Barr and
Atkins

(1980; cited in Coates, 1986) refute Lakoff's

(1975)

assertion regarding the so-called female tentativeness
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(modality)

in speech.

For O'Barr and Atkins observe that

courtroom speech is influenced by two primary factors: a
speaker's social status and previous courtroom experience,
not by gender.

As further ·argument against predominate

tentativeness in female speech, Holmes

(1984)

reports

greater modality and mitigation in men's tag questions than
in women's

Further, the women's

(see Table 1.2 below).

sp·eech contains nearly twice the percentage of affective
tags as the men's.

Table 1.2.

Epistemic

Gender: Tag Questions

Affective

Mitigative

(Modality)
Men

61%

25%

13%

Women

35%

59%

6%

(Holmes, 1984)

Does, then, gender truly influence tentativeness or,
contrastively, commitment in our speech?

I hypothesize

that it does, but only for isolated occasions or functions.
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CHAPTER TWO
MODALS:

TRUTH AND COMMITMENT

"There isr perhapsr no area of English grammar that is
both more important and more difficult than the system
of modals."
(Palmer, 1979, cited in Washingtonr 1991r
p.

1)

"Modalityr like negation or questionsr is apparently a
linguistic universal.
One can say that it appears in
all languages (in different ways) or even that any
language without it would be 'impossible'. "
(Washington, 1991, p.1)

Introduction
In chapter one, we defined speaker commitment in
speech acts and examined various influences and constraints
upon our commitment to our speech.

Certainly and

practically, however, the entirety of our speech is not
comprised exclusively of absolute commitment.

For example,

consider the following excerpts/citations from the
historical 2000 Presidential Election campaign speeches and
debates (Note: italics are my emphasis). George W. Bush
argued the need to improve education, "We must not leave
one child behind"

(Republican National Convention,

televised August 3, 2000).

He further asserted in the

first Presidential Debate, "I believe that if we find poor
children trapped in schools that won't teach, we need to
free the parents,"

(New York Times, October 5, 2000) to
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which Al Gore rebutted, "I don't think private schools
should have a right to take taxpayer money away from public

schools."

Concerning gun control, Al Gore postured, "None

of my proposals would have an effect on hunters or people
who use rifles"

(New York Times, October 19, 20001.

On the

issue of medical care Mr. Gore proposed, "I think we ought
to have a patients' bill of rights."

Mr. Bush countered,

"If I'm the president, we're going to have emergency room
care, we're going to have gag orders, women will have
direct access to OB-GYN, people will be able to take their
insurance company to court"
2000).

(New York_Times, October 18,

When questioned regarding the selection of U.S.

Supreme Court justices Governor Bush declared,

"I believe

in strict constructionists, and those are the kind of
judges I will appoint."

Vice President Gore contested,

"The constitution ought to be interpreted as a document
that grows with our country and our history (New York
Times, October 5, 2000).
In similar discourse following the election, on
November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled on
arguments which hinged upon two words, shall and may, in
Florida's statutes and election rules.

Effectively, the

Justices ruled unanimously that may in relationship to the
33

discretionary provision of authority granted to Florida's
Secretary of State supersedes shall referent to Florida's
Constitutional mandate to certify votes

(Hannity and

Calmes, November 21, 2000).
Woven throughout the previous rhetorical garment of
the 2000 Presidential Election is a common grammatical and
elocutionary thread, modality.

Modality is defined as

"that classification of propositions based on whether they
assert or deny the possibility, impossibility, contingency,
or necessity of their content" (American Heritage College
Dictionary, 1997, p. 876).

Rhetorically, modality may be

expressed in diverse constructions including, but not
limited to, 1) Core modals and/or semi-auxiliaries,
2) Lexical verbs

(particularly opinion referents),

3) Adverbs and sentence modifiers, 4)

Imperative and/or

subjunctive moods, 5) Non-linguistic cues,

6) Vocal

inflection, and 7) Truth-opposition statements such as
sarcasm, etc.

(Berk, 1999; Celce-Murcia

1999; Grice, 1990; Shiffrin, 1990).

&

Larsen-Freeman,

Thus, it follows that

modality in the English language is applied multifariously:
to speculate, hedge, mitigate, predict, .suggest or assert
advice, mandate, request, and express hopes and/or desires.
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The focus of this chapter, however, will be narrowed
in scope to the first of modality constructions listed,
core modals and semi-auxiliaries such as those highlighted

in the afore political context.

Specifically, I will

present their identification and meanings/functions
followed by a pragmatic survey of commitment and truth in
modal usage in Chapter 3.

Identification
We have already observed that modals play an integral
part in the political context of promises, debate, and law.
Moreover, Washington (1991) asserts that it is impossible
to express making plans, predicting future events, or
creating possible worlds (irrealis) without modals.

Thus,

the question follows, how then can we aptly identify and
appropriate modals in daily discourse?
Modals may be divided into two classifications, core
modals

(true modals) and semi-auxiliaries, also referred to

as phrasal, periphrastic, pseudo and quasi-modals
1999; Celce-Murcia
Celce-Murcia

&

&

(Berk,

Larsen-Freeman, 1999; Jacobs, 1995).

Larsen-Freeman (1999) define core modals as

"tenseless auxiliaries that take no subject-verb agreement
and no infinitive to before the following verb" (p. 137).
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Berk (1999)

characterizes these modals as "semantically

rich and inflectionally impoverished ... (they)

carry no

third person present {-s} ending ... and they have no past
participle forms, no present participle forms, and no
infinitive forms" (p. 132) .
Core modals traditionally have been divided into two
forms, those that historically were present tense and their
historically past tense forms.

These terms currently imply

semantic purpose (to be discussed later) rather than
standard tense.

Table 2.1.

Core Modals

Historically Present Tense

Historically Past Tense

shall

should

will

would

can

could

may

might

mot (lost during Middle English)

must
ought (to)

[need]
[dare]
Note:

[] requires negative and/or interrogative constructions

36

In Table 2.1 above, we observe that the historically past
tense was constructed by Old English "root vowel
alternation" (Matthews, 1996, p. 364) and the appendage of

{-d} or {-t} past tense suffixes to the historical present
(Berk, 1999).

Hence, The historically past tense of shall

is should and the historically past tense of will is would,
etc.
For every core modal there is a phrasal modal
counterpart as illustrated in Table 2.2 below.

(PM)

Jacobs

(1995) refers to these modal counterparts as periphrastic
modals because they "paraphrase (core) modal meanings" (p.
217).

Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999) best define

phrasal modals as "multiword forms ending in infinitive to,
which function semantically like true modals (in certain of
their meanings)" (p. 138).

Berk (1999) adds that such

modals usually begin with be, carry tense and subject-verb
agreement (with the exception of used to and had better),
and allow the present and past participle forms of aspect.
The tense and subject-verb agreement is inflected on be,
have, or the head verb (except PM's that have incorporated

the true modal would).

Further, tense and modality may be

added on the same verb form.

Adverbs other than the

negative not may not separate PM word components.
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Table 2.2.

Modal Counterparts

Core

Phrasal

shall

obliged to

will

be going to, be about to

may, might

be allowed to, be permitted to

can, could

be able to

must

have to, have got to

should, ought (to)

be to, be supposed to

would (past habit)

used to

Other semi-auxiliaries that have been accepted as modals in
contemporary English include: be sure to, be bound to, be (un)likely
to, be certain to, be (un)willing to, be due to, seems to, appears to
be, need to, want to, had better, had best, would rather, would prefer
to, and would like to.
(Berk, 1999; Celce-Murcia

&

Larsen-Freeman, 1999; and Jacobs, 1995)

Remarkably, phrasal modals, particularly those ending
in to, possess a strong enough semantic tie between to and
the word immediately preceding, that the two words actually
become one lexical unit in casual daily speech.

Thereby,

have to becomes "hafta," got to becomes "gotta," going to
converts to "gonna," and need to is often spoken "needsta,"
etc.

(Jacobs, 1995)

Meanings and Functions
Having identified modals, we turn our attention to
their meaning and function.

Modals present five semantic

38

potentials: 1) alternative state(s) of the subject, 2)
intimation of time, 3) antithesis of tense, 4)
inference, and 5) deontic assertion.

epistemic

First, Washington

informs that modals project alternative subject

(1991)

states (states that are non-existent at the present place
and time)

that regular verbs do not.

Regular verbs present

the subject of a sentence in its actual state.

Further, a

regular verb limits its subject to only one actual state.
For example,

John is the son of Dr. and Mrs. Larson.

The

former sentence expresses that John, the subject, clearly
belongs to the Larsons.
his sole actual state.

His belonging to the Larsons is
The verb is neither implies or

allows any other state for John.

In contrast, modals can

imply a representation of many possible alternative subject
states.

Larson.

For example, John may be the son of Dr. and Mrs.
The modal may in this example allows multiple

alternative states of the subject.

For it is possible that

John is the Larson's son; it is also possible that John is
not.

Moreover, he may be the son of any number of people,

i.e. the Smith's, the Blake's, the Teller's, etc.
Not only do modals have the ability to imply possible
alternative states, but they can also suggest necessary
alternative states "different from the presentr actual one"
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(Washington, 1991, p. 4; see also Hinkel, 1995).

Consider

the following sentences:
(1)

Dan and Shelley must make a shopping list before
going to Albertson's.

(2)

Mary should do her homework.

Both sentences express the need for a subject state other
than the present, actual one.

In sentence 1, Dan and

Shelley have not actually made a shopping list.

However,

must suggests a necessary change of state prior to

shopping, i.e., the making of a shopping list.

Sentence 2

represents Mary's present actual state as not having done
her homework.

Should manifests a necessary, different

state for Mary, i.e., doing her homework.

The suggested

alternative state also implies alternative outcome(s).

For

example, sentence 2 expresses that Mary's necessary
alternative state, doing homework, would have different
results (i.e., better grades, different responses from her
parents and teacher, etc.) than her present actual state of
not having done her homework.

Conclusively, having

observed the semantic implications of the possible versus
the necessary alternative states,
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"deciding between the

possible and necessary," then, is "basic to the way a
writer (or speaker)

chooses to represent the alternate

state" (Washington, 1991, p. 9).
In addition to presenting alternative states, modals
also intimate time--past, present and future--for such
states.

Past modality may be expressed by usage of a modal

followed by have and a main verb in {-en} or {-ed} past
participle construction (perfect aspect).

might have gone home.

For example, Dan

As previously demonstrated, might

expresses alternative states for the subject, Dan.
Additionally, the modal might in conjunction with have gone
(the present perfect aspect of go)

expresses that the

alternative states of going home or going somewhere else
occurred in the indefinite past.
Traditionally, present time has generally been
indicated by the use of an historic~lly past tense modal
followed by a bare infinitive (infinitive without to),
although contemporary English is incorporating historically
present forms also.

Dan at the door.

Consider the sentence,

That could be

Again, the modal could suggests

alternative states for That.

Furthermore, historically

past could followed by the bare infinitive be intimates the
present tense for those alternative states.
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For we may

insert an adverb of present time and maintain the exact
sentence meaning:

That could be Dan at the door (now).

The third meaning of time, the future,

is expressed by

the use of an historically present tense modal immediately
followed by a bare infinitive.

In the sentence, Darla will

have to leave soon in order to get to the library before it
closes., Darla is not at the library at the present time.
Will have to presents an alternative state of necessity for

Darla (i.e., getting to the library before it.closes),
which if it is actually to take place, will take:place in
the indefinite future.

Thus, we observe that commitment in

speech acts may include a modal referent to past, present,
or future time.
Although we have observed time referents for modality,
modals are antithetical to regular tensed verbs,
semantically.

For modals uniquely enable the speaker to

interpose subjective interjections of his/her perception,
proposition and/or perspective on discourse that the use of
regular present or past tense verbs does not allow.

Modals

may convey the speaker's attitudes, politeness, indirect
inferences (such as indirect requests), assertiveness
(e.g., advice), consent/approval, alternatives to yes or no
responses, and degree of probability/possibility,
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certainty, or commitment (Celce-Murcia
1999; Washington, 1991).

&

Larsen-Freeman,

Contrast the following sentences:

(3) Sam is an engineer.
(4) Sam might be an engineer.
The tense inflected copula in sentence (3) states only
present fact that Sam's occupation indeed is that of an
engineer.

However, the modal might in sentence (4)

interjects the speaker's degree of certainty/uncertainty
that Sam is an engineer.

And in so doing, the statement

moves from a factual account to a proposition of the
speaker's subjective conjecture, which lacks speaker
commitment to the proposition as being truth.

"The ways in which speakers indicate their degree of
commitment to the truth of a given proposition" is referred
to as epistemic meaning (Berk, 1999, p. 130).

Commitment

to the truth may take the form of absolute modality
[Matthews'

(1996) poles of necessity, certainty and

impossibility] or relative modality (degrees of
possibility, probability and improbability that exist
In the sentence Mike will win

between the absolute poles).

the race, the modal will expresses the speaker's positive
assertion of high probability.

In contrast, Mike could win

the race suggests, through the modal could, the speaker's
43

positive assertion of low probability.

Relative modality

between the two degrees of commitment is expressed by
statements such as Mike should win the race, Mike may win

the race, and Mike might win the race (from highest to
lowest probability).

Negative assertions of uncertainty,

improbability and impossibility are stated with the adverb
not or prefixes such as {un-} and {im-}, as in the phrasal
modal is unlikely to.

The package might not arrive on time

expresses negative assertion of low possibility.

The

negative assertion of impossibility is stated The package

can't arrive on time.

Modality between these extremes may

be expressed (from highest to lowest possibility)

The

package may not arrive on time, The package is unlikely to
arrive on time, and The package won't arrive on time.
following model

The

(Table 2.3) is a helpful characterization

of epistemic usage.
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Table 2. 3.

Epistemic Usages

predict.

Potentialis

subjective

relative modality

concess.

potentialis

subjective

relative modality

can

realis

objective

relative modality

will

potentialis

subjective

positive assertion

must

potentialis

subjective

absolute modality

have/got to

realis

objective

absolute modality

might

irrealis

subjective

relative modality

potentialis

subjective

-relative modality

could

potentialis/
irrealis

objective

relative modality

would

irrealis

(?)

positive assertion

should

potentialis

subjective

-absolute modality
positive assertion

ought

potentialis

objective

-modality

may

(- =downgraded)

(Matthews, 1996, p. 373)

In contrast to epistemic meaning and function, modals
may also be used to express deontic meaning (also called

root modality) by asserting directives or volition for
potential action.

Berk (1999) defines directives as "any

utterance in which a speaker tries to get someone else to
behave in a particular way" (p. 131).

Examples include

giving or requesting advice or permission; soliciting
commitment; and asserting mandate/prohibition, instruction,
or reprimand.
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Examples:

(6) What should/can I do?

(requesting advice)

(7) You should/could invest in long-term
options.

(giving advice)

(8) May I leave now?

(requesting permission)

(9) You may take a break.
(10) Will you go with me?

(giving permission)
(soliciting commitment)

(11) You must/will do your homework.

(mandate)

(12) You should circle the correct answer.
(instruction)
(13) You should have called.

(reprimand)

Deontic volition encompasses the utterance of commitment
(agreement or promise), intention (including threats),
desire, willingness (i.e., making an offer or invitation),
or preference.
Examples:

(14)

I will pick you up at 8:00.

(15)

I'm going to keep trying.

(commitment)

(intention)

(16) She would like to order now.
(17)

I would be happy to help you.

(desire)
(willingness)

(18) Carla would rather sleep than eat.
(preference)
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Matthews

(1996) reports the following representation

of deontic usage (p. 373).
Table 2. 4.
may

potentialis

Deontic Usages
subjective

relative modality

can

realis

objective

relative modality

must

potentialis

subjective

absolute modality

shall *

potentialis

subjective

absolute modality

potentialis

subjective

positive assertion

will

potentialis

objective

positive assertion

have/got to

realis

objective

absolute modality

might

irrealis

subjective

relative modality

could

irrealis

objective

relative modality

should

potentialis

subjective

-absolute modality

irrealis

subjective

.-absolute modality

potentialis

objective

ought (to)

(* used deontically only)

-absolute modality

(- =downgraded)

As a noteworthy exception to Matthew's representation
(Figure 2.4), not only does will imply positive assertion,
will also carries meaning of absolute modality.
(1983)

Coates

attributes meanings of intention and willingness to

deontic, volitional will.

Jacobs (1995) also asserts,

"will indicates intentionr" and continues, "Intention is
the imposition upon 'oneself' of an obligation to take some
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action" (P. 227).
will marry you.

For example, Will you marry me?

Yes, I

As (self or other) imposed obligation,

i.e., promise or commitment, will is absolute modality.
Lastly, in the discussion of meanings/functions of
modals, consideration is given to the contrastive function
of modals in quoted versus reported speech.

Historically

present modals are used to quote actual speech of others
for the purpose of preserving the speech integrity
(perception, propositional intent, and/or perspective) of
the one being quoted

(Berk, 1999; Celce-Murcia

Freeman, 1999; Matthews, 1996).

&

Larsen-

For example, Miss Reeves

said, "I will collect your assignment at the beginning of
class tomorrow."

Herein, the quoter commits him/herself to

a representation of truth to the other's speech.
Contrastively, modals that were historically past
tense, are applied to reported speech (Berk, 1999; Celce
Murcia

&

Larsen-Freeman, 1999; Matthews, 1996).

The

speaker chooses to assign reported speech to another's
discourse in order to create a means through which he/she
may interpose his/her personal opinion, emotion, and
inferences about the other's speech.

Reported speech,

then, is relayed in the form David told me that he would
help i f he weren't too busy on Monday.
48

We may observe from

this example that reported speech allows the reporter 1) to
distance him/herself from a commitment to truth of the
other's speech and 2) to incorporate relativity and
subjectivity into the same.
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CHAPTER THREE
SURVEY

Introduction
In a televised discussion with Fox News host Tony Snow
(November 25, 2000), regarding the ongoing Presidential
contest, Jim Pinkerton of Newsday compared current American
values to Einstein's "Theory of Relativity."

He states,

"There are no absolutes! . . . The relative of the
circumstance and the moment dictates the truth."

Having

contemplated Mr. Pinkerton's statement, I ponder whether
his assertion regarding current American values might
accurately reflect our spoken American English language
with particular respect to modal usage.

Accordingly, ·as an

experiment of research to investigate propositional truth
and commitment in modal usage, I pose the following
questions for survey:
1. Do speakers· express absolute commitment throughmodal usage?

If culture is reflected in language

(Hinkel, 1995), do Matthew's

(1996) poles of

absolute modality and Celce-Murcia

&

µarsen

Freeman's (1999) modal commitment to certainty
remain?
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2. What modals do speakers perceive to convey the
strongest and weakest degree/meanings of commitment?
3. Do speakers prefer the directness of the positive
assertion can or the distancing, yet polite form

could when speaking commitment?
4. Does the usage of can versus could change the
degree/meaning of a speaker's commitment in speech?
5. How do speakers' perceptions of commitment through
the use of the modal will relate to relationships
between speakers and hearers?
6. Are age, gender, occupationr ·and/o~ native language
relational to the degree and/or propositional truth
of commitment in speech?
7. Are speakers' perceptions of their level of
commitments consistent with or variant to their
reported actual keeping of commitments?
8. Do speakers use the phrasal modal need to
consistently ~n daily discourse to mean literally

necessity?
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Method
As a medium to acquire unprejudiced data, a 16
question written survey, primarily multiple choice, was
created.

(See Appendix A)

In an effort not to bias or

limit speakers' preference, in each of the multiple choice
survey questions respondents are asked whether they prefer
to say other/write in, as well as to write the reason for
their stated preference.

To elicit an answer to research

question 1, Do speakers use modals to express absolute

commitment?, the survey's multiple-choice questions offer
the following options: absolute commitment, relative
degrees of commitment between absolute commitment and non
commitment, and other/write in (Exception: these options.
are non-applicable to multiple-choice question #13).

In

order to observe which modals speakers perceive to convey
the strongest and weakest degrees/meanings of commitment
(research question 2), survey questions #1 and 7 ask the
respondents to rate modals from the strongest to the
weakest meaning of commitment as they would use the modals
in daily speech.

To inquire whether speakers prefer to

utter commitment by direct assertion or polite distancing
(research question 3), survey question #3 directly asks
respondents their preference for saying can or could when
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speaking commitment.

Survey questions #5 and 10 are

devoted to answering research question 4 with respect to
the respondent's intended degree/meaning of commitment
through the use of can versus could in daily conversation.
Survey question #5 asks the respondents what degree of
commitment they mean when saying I can help you tomorrow;
likewise survey question #10 asks the respondents what
degree of commitment they mean when saying I could help you
tomorrow. In effort to answer research question 5, How do
speakers' perceptions of commitment.through the use of the
modal "will" relate to relationships between speakers and
hearers, survey questions #2,

6, 8, and 11 ask the

respondents what they mean when saying I will do it
respectively to an employer, employee, friend or co-worker,
and casual acquaintance.

Survey question #15 directly asks

respondents their age, gender, occupation, and native
language; responses have been crosstabbed against each
responses to each question in the survey in order to answer
research question 6, Are age, gender, occupation, and/or
native language relational to the degree and/or
propositional truth of commitment in speech.

In an attempt

to evaluate whether speakers' perceptions of their level of
commitments are consistent with or variant to their
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reported actual keeping of commitments (research question
7), survey questions #12, 14, and 16 respectively ask
respondents whether in the past year they have uttered
commitment but failed to keep their commitment, the
frequency that they utter commitment but fail to keep their
commitment, and the degree of commitment that they prefer
to make.

The responses to survey questions #12, 14, and 16

are compared/contrasted.

Finally, the aim of research

question 8 was to observe whether need to is consistently
spoken with the literal intended meaning of necessity;
accordingly, survey question #9 asks respondents what they
meant by need to the last time they told their employer
that they needed to take time off.

The survey was reviewed

by two California State University (San Bernardino, CA)
English professors and graduate peers prior to distribution
to the public.
A total of sixty-eight persons were surveyed; of the
sixty-eight surveys returned, three were incomplete and
were necessarily set aside.

Thus, the percentages and

numbers of this report are based on a total population of
65 persons.

This population is defined by the following:

43% ages 18-25, 37% ages 26-45, 19% ages 46 or older; 40%
male and 60% female; non-native English speakers 19% (1.5%
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Chech, 3% Spanish, 3% Korean, 1.5% Japanese, 5% Chinese,
1.5% Russian, 1.5% Vietnamese).

Three percent declined to

answer native language.
Sampling of five populations and/or sites was chosen
in an attempt to gather an honest, integrous representation
of the general public.

Sites selected for survey include

Wal-mart's main exit (Hemet, CA; 17 persons surveyed) and
California State University's Student Commons (20 persons
surveyed) and University Hall (10 persons surveyed).
Persons surveyed at the Student Commons and University Hall
are of diverse majors/disciplines other than English.
Additional respondents include acquaintances and friends
(non-university,

6 persons surveyed) and volunteers of a

graduate multilingual English class (12 persons surveyed)
These volunteers are English proficient, but have not been
biased by classroom instruction specific to modals.
Surveys were distributed and collected by myself;
there were no intermediaries.

Respondents completed the

surveys in my presence at the time of distribution to them.
Further, individuals did not collaborate or discuss the
questions with others.
Findings were hand calculated twice for accuracy.
Additionally, statistical frequencies and Pearson chi55

square cross tab probabilities (seeking P=0.05 or less)
were tabulated using SPSS 10.0 application.

Findings
To test the respondents' perceptions of which modals
convey the strongest and weakest degree/meanings of
commitment, question one of the survey asks participants to
rate the modals can, will, and may, in the order of
probability and/or commitment as the participant would use
them in daily conversation.

In Table 3.1 below, we notice

that greater than three-fourths of the surveyed population
perceive will as meaning the strongest commitment of the
three modals, which is consistent with Celce-Murcia

&

Larsen-Freeman (1999) and Jacobs (1995).
However, we observe particular disparity with regard
to can.

Whereas Celce-Murcia

&

Larsen-Freeman and Jacob$

ascribe greater certainty to may over can, three-fifths of
the surveyed participants attribute greater certainty to
can over may.

Moreover, an unexpected 20.6% of the

participants evaluate can as communicating stronger
commitment than will.

56

Table 3 .1.

Commitment Strength I

Strongest

Weakest

Mid

Frequency

Valid %

Will

47

77 .0%

9

14.8%

5

8.2%

Can

13

20.6%

39

61.9%

11

17.5%

May

6

9. 7%

12

19.4%

44

71.0%

Frequency

Valid %

Frequency

Valid %

Further, with respect to can and in response to question #5
of the survey, When saying, "I 'can' help you tomorrow,"

what do you mean?, an overwhelming 69.2% replied absolute
commitment, rather than probable or possible commitment.
Moreover, in question #3, participants were asked
their preferences for saying can or could in daily
conversation.

Deference (nearly 70%) was given to the

directness of the positive assertion I can over the
distant, albeit polite form,

I could (10.8%).

remaining participants answered other.]

[The

However, in answer

to question 10, When saying, "I 'could' help you tomorrow,

what do you mean?, forty percent still indicated absolute
commitment, as opposed to lesser commitment.
Desiring to be cautious about generalizations, I
question whether the divergence of can from published
theory and grammar texts is an isolated movement among
survey participants or whether the disparity would extend
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rr

beyond the population surveyed.

Future study of the modal

may be warranted to determine if there is a moving trend
from weak to strong commitment in the practical meaning and
usage of can.
To further test the respondents' perceptions of which
modals convey the strongest and weakest degree of
commitment in speech, question #7 of the survey was set
forth.

Similar to question #1 (previously discussed),

participants were asked to rate the modals could, should,
might,

ought, and must from strongest to weakest

probability and commitment used in their daily language.
In Table 3.2 below, we first observe discordant use of
must.

The majority (55.2%) of respondents use must in

their daily speech as the strongest commitment modal among
the five.

On the other hand, must also is used as the

weakest modal by approximately one-third (32.8%) of the
participants surveyed.

Second, reiterating the

unanticipated strength of can, nearly one-fourth (23.3%)
surveyed use could, the historically past tense of can, as
meaning stronger commitment than must.

In fact, nearly 75%

of respondents use can (the modal to which weakness is
theoretically attributed) to mean mid to strongest
certainty and commitment of the five modals.
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Whereas half

(51.7%) of the respondents use should for speaking strong
self-commitment (slightly less than .the absolute· certainty
attributed to must), 25% use can for stronger commitment
than should. Fourth, ought is congruently spoken as mid to
weak commitment.

Lastly, the most frequent

(nearly 75%)

use of might is equably spread throughout the mid to
weakest end of the continuum.

Table 3.2.

Commitment Strength II

1

2

3

4

5

Strongest

Strong

Mid

Weak

Weakest

F

VP

F

VP

F

VP

F

VP

F

VP

32

55.2%

4

6.9%

2

3.4%

1

1. 7%

19

32.8%

Could 14

23.3%

15

25. 0%

14

23.3%

9

15.0%

8

13.3%

Might

9

15.0%

9

15.0%

13

21.7%

15

25. 0%

14

23.3%

Should 5

8.6%

30

51.7%

14

24.1%

8

13.8%

1

1. 7%

Ought

3.4%

7

12.1%

19

32.8%

23

39.7%

7

12.1%

Must

2

In comparison, Jacobs
Freeman (1999)

(1995)

and Celce-Murcia

&

Larsen

suggest the following parallel continuums

(Table 3.3 below)

for the previous modals, attributing

strongest commitment and certainty to must, and conversely,
weakest commitment to could (can) and might.
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Table 3.3.

Theoretical Commitment Strength
Celce-Murcia

&

Larsen-Freeman

Jacobs

High Certainty

Strongest
Must

Must

Should

Should, ought

Ought

Could, might
Low Certainty

Could
Might
Weakest

Having reviewed the participants' stated evaluation of
modals as they pertain to probability and commitment in
their daily speech, we now turn our attention to survey
questions #2,

6, 8, and 11 to examine any relationships

between commitment and speaker/hearer relationship.

Table

3.4 on the following page illustrates the diverse speaker
commitment toward hearers of four differing relationships
with the speaker:

employer, co-worker/friend, family, and

casual acquaintance.

The results were obtained by asking

What do you mean by "I will?" when speaking to persons of
each relationship.

In the speech of 55% of participants

surveyed, commitment is affected by speaker/addressee
relationship.
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Table 3.4.

Relationship Correlation

To Employer
F

QB

Q6

Q2

VP

To Friend/
Co-worker
F

Qll
To Casual
Acquaintance

To Family
F

VP

F

VP

VP

Absolute

43

67.2%

38

58.5%

37

56.9

27

41. 5%

Commitment,
providing...

20

31. 3%

26

40.0%

21

32.3%

23

35.4%

Probable

0

0.0%

1

1.5%

5

7. 7%

7

10.8%

Possible

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

2

3.1%

8

12.3%

Other

1

1. 6%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

Table 3.4 above suggests a decline of absolute commitment
as the relationship between speaker and addressee becomes
more familiar and less power oriented.
that the greatest frequency (67.2%)

First, we observe

of absolute commitment

occurs in the vertical, power relationship of an employee
(subordinate)

speaking to an employer (superordinate).

We

also note the absence of relative (i.e., probable and
possible) commitment to the employer.

Comparatively,

absolute commitment spoken to a friend/co-worker,
by nearly ten percent--from a percentage of 67%
employer)

to 58.5%

declines

(to

(to friend/co-worker), whereas frequency

of provisional commitment to a friend/co-worker
reciprocally increases by approximately the same percentage
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from 31.3% (to employer) to 40%

(to friend/co-worker)

Thus, among the surveyed participants, we observe a
relationship between power and speaker commitment.
Additionally, a link between speaker commitment and
horizontal, powerless relationships is notable among survey
participants.

Absolute commitment to addressees with whom

the speaker has more frequent and intimate interaction
and/or exchange (i.e., family,

friends/co-workers)

exceeds

absolute commitment to socially distanced acquaintances by
greater than 15%.

Curiously, a greater frequency of

tentative, provisional commitment is meant when speaking to
friends/co-workers

(40.0%) and casual acquaintances

than when speaking to family members(32.3%).

(35.4%)

Also,

commitment meanings of lesser degree, i.e., probable and
possible, are intended when speaking to family and
acquaintances; however, probable and possible commitments
are essentially non-intended when speaking to friends/co
workers and employers.
In the previous par~graphs, we have discriminated the
types of commitments spoken by respondents.

However, do

these speakers of English utter commitment truthfully?
they keep their commitments?

Do

In answer to question 12 of

the survey, nearly 75% admit to having broken commitments
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spoken in the past year.

(Note: One could reasonably argue

an interpretive flexibility of 5% for unforeseen,
uncontrollable events that might truly preclude a person
from keeping a commitment.)

When asked in question #13 to

whom did you not keep your cornrnitment(s), the greatest
percentage was to family and friends,
intimate relationships.

i.e., the more

On the other hand, power

relationships in the workplace have the least frequency of
broken commitments, of which, the percentage to employers
is slightly higher than to employees.

Table 3.5.

See Table 3.5 below.

Broken Comrnitment(s) To Whom?
F

VP

To family member

27

42.2%

To friend

22

34.4%

To acquaintance

21

32.8%

To co-worker

11

17.2%

To Employer

7

10.9%

To Employee

4

6.3%

To compare and contrast participants' perception of
the degree/meaning of their spoken commitments against the
actual degree/meaning of respondents' spoken commitments,
two additional questions were asked:
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question 14, What is

the frequency that you tell someone "I will r

,,,,

but do not

carry out the action? and question 16, Which

(kind of

commitment) do you generally prefer to make?

An astounding

77.8% of participants state that they rarely break a spoken
I

"will,,,, commitment (although 7 5% previously disclosed

their actually having broken an I "will,,,, commitment
recently); 4.8% assert never.

In comparison, nearly 70% of

persons surveyed indicate their preference to make definite
commitments, whereas 25% prefer to commit tentatively.
Interestingly, approximately 5% state a preference for
speaking no commitment(s).
Finally, we turn our attention to observe four
variables age, gender, occupation, and native language in
relation to commitment in speech.

Each variable has been

cross-tabbed throughout the survey to explore correlation,
if any, between the variable and spoken commitment among
the population surveyed.
Pearson chi-sguare testing indicates correlation
between age range and the meaning/degree of commitment(s)
spoken to employers and co-workers.
Table 3.6 below.

First, we observe

When saying I will to an employer, nearly

83% of respondents in the age range 26-45 and 77% in the
age range 46+ mean absolute commitment.
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Contrastively,

participants ages 18-25 intend nearly equal absolute (48%)
and provisional (52%) commitment to their employers.

Table 3.6.

Age Range:

Spoken Commitment To Employer
P=.015

N=63

Ages 18-25

Ages 26-45

N=27

N=23

VP

F

VP

F

Ages 46+
N=l3
VP

F

Absolute

13

48.1%

19

82.6%

10

76.9%

Commitment,
providing...

14

51. 9%

4

17.4%

2

15.4%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

1

7. 7%

Other

Also significant, when saying I will to co-workers,
approximately 70% of respondents in the age ranges of 26-45
and 46+ mean absolute commitment, compared to 39% of those
ages 18-25, who intend absolute commitment and nearly 60%
who mean relative commitment.

(See Table 3.7 below.)
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Table 3.7.

Age Range:

Spoken Commitment To Co-worker

N=64

P=.018

Ages 18-25

Ages 26-45

N=28

N=23

F

N=13

VP

F

VP

Ages 46+

F

VP

Absolute

11

39.2%

17

73.9%

9

69.2%

Commitment,
providing...

17

60. 7%

6

26.0%

3

23.0%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

1

7. 7%

Probable

Second, age range is related to commitment kept to
friends:

As Table 3.8 below illustrates, the percentage of

failed commitment declines as age range increases.

Table 3.8.

Age Range:

Failed Commitment(s) To Friends
P=. 01

N=63

Ages 18-25

Ages 26-45

N=28

N=23

F

14

VP
50.0%

F

8

Ages 46+
N=l2

VP
34.8%

F

VP

0

0.0%

In addition to age range, responses to question 10 of
the survey suggest that a relationship exists between
gender and commitment when using the "polite" modal could
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(See Table 3.9 below).

When saying,

I could help you

tomorrow, approximately 50% of the females surveyed mean
absolute commitment.

Contrastively, only 25% of the males

speak with the same intended meaning.

Table 3.9.

Gender:

When Saying, "I Could"

N=65

P=.033

Male

Female

N=24

N=41

F

VP

VP

F

You can count on my help.

6

25.0%

20

48.8%

My help is probable.

2

8.3%

8

19.5%

My help is possible.

9

37.5%

8

19.5%

I'm considering helping you.

2

8.3%

3

7.3%

I'm saying this to appease you.

4

16. 7%

0

0.0%

Other

1

4.2%

2

4.9%

Second, the intended meaning of stated commitments is
congruent between male and female; however, the consistency
between the females' perception of keeping commitments and
their reported actual fulfillment of commitments is greater
than that of males, whose perception of keeping their
commitments is higher than their reported actual keeping of
commitments.

In Table 3.10 below, we find in response to
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question 12 that nearly 80% of men surveyed admit to having
broken a spoken commitment in the past year.

Table 3.10.

Gender:

Said, "I Will,n But Didn't
N=64

Male

Female

N=24

N=40

F

19

VP

F

79.2%

28

VP

70.0%

However, in the following table (3.11), we observe
that over 91% percent of males state that they never or

rarely break a spoken commitment.

In contrast, 70% of

females surveyed admit to saying, "I will," in the past
year, but did not keep the commitment (Table 3.10 above),
which is closely consistent with 77.5% of females stating
that they rarely say, "I will," but do not keep the
commitment (Table 3.11 below).

Interestingly though, no

female respondents report never saying, "I will," but not
keeping the commitment.
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Table 3.11.

Gender:

Frequency to Say, "I Will," Bbt Don't
N=63

Male

Female

N=23

N=40

F
Never

F

VP

VP

3

13.0%

0

0.0%

18

78.3%

31

77.5%

Occasionally

1

4.3%

5

12.5%

50% of time

1

4.3%

3

7.5%

Often (Greater
than 50% of time)

0

0.0%

1

2.5%

Rarely

A third variable, native language, seemingly
influences the keeping of commitment to casual acquaintance
among respondents.

Table 3.12 below illustrates that

whereas 75% of native English speaking respondents reported
keeping spoken commitments to acquaintances in the previous
year, only 42% of non-native English speaking respondents
did so.

(Note:

The number of non-English speaking

respondents totaled 12 or one-fifth of the respondents
surveyed, a small, yet valid sample.)

Variances in

commitments to other relationships and modal meanings were
not significant.
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Table 3.12.

Native Language: Commitments To Acquaintances
P=.026

N=60

Native Ss of English

Non-native Ss of English

N=48

N=l2

F

F

VP

VP

Kept

36

75.0%

5

41. 7%

Broken

12

25.0%

7

58.3%

Fourth, no notable correlation between occupation and
commitment in speech is observed; rather, strong
correlation occurs between vertical, power relationships
and participants' commitments as previously discussed.
Finally, we observe among respondents a divergence
from a commitment to truth with regard to the literal,
spoken usage of need to.

Table 3.13 below illustrates that

when last saying to employer, "I need to take time off,"
only 52.3% of the respondents meant necessity, whereas 40%
last used the modal to mean desire or want.

Subsequent

studies would be required to determine if the afore
findings would extend beyond the present population and/or
demographics.
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Table 3.13.

To Employer:

"Need To"

N=65

VP

F

Necessary circumstances
(health, death, etc.)

34

52.3%

Desired a break
(day off or vacation)

18

27. 7%

Wanted to go elsewhere
(e.g., to a ballgame)

8

12.3%

Other

5

7.7%

Summary
Operatively, among a small majority (56%) of
respondents, speaking and intending absolute commitment is
a norm. The reciprocal, however, is that the meaning of

will as a positively asserted absolute pole or a commitment
to certainty has diminished to relative commitment·
(provisional, probable, possible, and other) among 44% of
respondents surveyed.

The intended degree/meaning of

spoken commitment of 55% of respondents surveyed is
affected by the relationship between the respondent and
his/her hearer. Moreover, a vast discrepancy exists between
the stated meaning/degree of commitment and the actual
reported keeping of commitment.

The stated preference of

commitment type is congruent to the stated degree/meaning

71

of commitment to an employer only.

Notwithstanding,

incongruity appears between the respondents' perception of
their keeping commitments and their reported actual
reported fulfillment of commitments.

(Conceivably,

however, it is possible to break a commitment once in a
year and accurately report rarely failing to keep one's
commitments . )
We have observed through a study of variables that age
range plays a significant role in both the degree/meaning
of commitments expressed through the modal will .and the
respondents' perceptions of their actual keeping_of
commitments.

Adults over the age of 26 demonstrate a

higher degree/meaning of commitments through the modal
will. Further, the frequency of commitments spoken and kept
to a friend increases as age range increases.
Gender is a limited imposing variable.

The

intended meaning of stated commitments expressed through
the modal will is congruent between male and female.
However, when using the "polite," former past tense of can,
i.e.,

could, the majority of females intend absolute

commitment, whereas the greater majority of males intend
relative commitment.

Additionally, the consistency between

the females' perception of keeping commitments and their
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reported actual fulfillment of commitments is greater than
that of males, whose perception of their keeping
commitments is higher than their actual keeping of
commitments.

(As previously noted: conceivably, it is

possible to break a commitment once in a year and
accurately report rarely failing to keep one's
commitments.)
With respect to the modal will, correlation is noted
between native language and the respondents' reported
keeping of commitments to acquaintances, although sampling
is small.

Whereas a greater majority of native English

speaking participants reported keeping their commitments to
acquaintances in the previous year, approximately the same
percentage of non-native English speaking respondents
reported their not keeping spoken commitments to casual
acquaintances.
Occupation as a correlation variable has proven
insignificant in this study.
However, relationships, power-oriented and social,
draw considerable correlation with higher intended
degree/meaning of commitments in speech as well as with a
greater frequency of commitments kept.
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The most striking find of the present research is the
divergence of the respondents' daily usage of can from
published theory and grammar texts.

Almost one-fourth of

persons surveyed use can as the strongest modal of speaker
commitment; in other words, respondents employ its usage to
mean stronger speaker commitment than will.

Additionally,

could, the modal that historically was the past tense of
can, is used by nearly 25% of respondents to mean stronger

speaker commitment than must.

Further, approximately 70%

of respondents mean mid to strongest commitment when they
say, "I could." Desiring to be cautious about
generalizations, I question whether this divergence of the
meaning of can and its former past tense could from
published theory and grammar texts is an isolated movement
among survey participants, or whether the disparity extends
beyond the surveyed population.

Further study of can and

could is warranted.

Discussion
General
In the introduction of the present thesis, two
questions were posed: 1) If we as speakers of English
circumvent commitment to the propositional truth in our
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speech, do we genuinely practice speaking cooperatively 1·n
mutual commitment to truth? and 2) If we speak commitmen
but do not intend commitment, do we subtly speak lies?
Moreover, we have discussed Grice's Co-operative Princi~le
which states that conversation requires three co-operat~ve

elements:

co-operative effort(s), common purpose (s), and

mutually accepted direction between speaker(s) and
hearer(s).

Further, the Co-operative Principle includes a

supermaxim of Quality which state~, "make your ~ontribulion
one that is true .

Do not say what you believe to bl

false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence" (Grice, 1990).

Therefore, speakers engaged in

discourse assume mutually co-operative truth in exchangrd
utterances.

The findings of this survey, however, reflect

daily conversation that is contrary to the principles of
co-operative truth.

In fact,

75% of those surveyed a

it

to having spoken commitment in the last year, but not
having .kept it; 55% indicate that although they say I

ill

(the modal to which absolute commitment is ascribed in
modern theory), their intended meaning/degree (and
consequently, propositional truth) of their spoken
commitment(s) changes (without indication to the heareT)
according to their relationship with the addressee.
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Tlus,

we must acknowledge that we as speakers of English d~ not
always demonstrate co-operative truth in our speech.

Our

individual speaker strategies, which are influenced and/or
motivated by self or other-politeness, age, gender, Jative

I

language/culture, and speaker-hearer relationship,

\

seemingly lead us to variable effort(s), diverse purprse(s)

and divergent direction(s).
intend another meaning.
actual spoken word(s)

We speak one thing, yet we

I

However, the addressee hears the

and expects propositional truthi and

thus, the fulfillment of that commitment which is spolen.
In addition to a divergence from co-operative trjth,
we observe discrepancies among respondents in modal
meanings used in daily conversation.

The two greatest

examples in the survey findings are can and must.

Although

77% of respondents use will as the strongest modal of
commitment (among can, will, and may), more than 20% use

can to mean strongest commitment.

Of the modals must,

could, might, should, and ought, only 55% use must to
indicate strongest commitment, while nearly 33% use mu\t to
mean weakest commitment.

Therefore, it is pragmaticall!Y

conceivable in daily conversation that a speaker may usl

can as a modal of relative commitment, yet the hearer
encodes can to mean absolute commitment, and so the
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reciprocal

(See Table 3.1).

Likewise, a speaker may say

must meaning strongest commitment while the hearer encJdes
must as weakest commitment (see Table 3.2).

In such

instances we would observe miscommunication rather than cooperative speech.

Thus, sociolinguistically, implications

for potential interpersonal and interethnic conflict become
numerous if we cannot commonly discern whether a statemknt
such as I will. .. is meant to be absolute or relative
commitment.
Teaching English as a
Second Language
Why should a study of modality and the avoidance of
absolute commitment in speech acts be important to
pedagogy, particularly to TESL?

Palmer (1979) states,

"There is, perhaps, no area of English grammar that is l:::loth
more important and more difficult than the system of
modals" (cited in Washington, 1991, p.1).

Further,

Washington (1991) proposes, "Modality [i.e.,

'that

classification of propositions based on whether they assert
or deny the possibility, impossibility, contingency, or
necessity of their content'

(American Heritage College

Dictionary, 1997, p. 876)], like negation or questions, is
apparently a linguistic universal.
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One can say that it

appears in all languages (in different ways) or even that
any language without it would be 'impossible'" (p.1).
Pragmatically, in the common workplace, which includes both
.

\

native and non-native speakers of English, Willing (1\97)
asserts that "modality is a crucially important enabling

I

competence," particularly for problem solving; howevet, his

I

study finds that non-native speakers "tended very often to
be less sharply articulated than they could have been, due
in large part to only rudimentary control of the indioators
of modality"

(p. 33).

Thus, the need for second lang age

learners' acquisition of modals is compelling.
Specific to modal acquisition, Linnell (1991), in her
study of non-instructed versus instructed non-native
speakers of English finds that ESL instruction is
significant to the acquisition of complex grammars,
specifically modals; instruction proved remarkably more
effective than interaction.

However, she asserts_ that ESL

texts present a pragmatic instructional problem:

current

texts give grammatical instruction, but fail. to· includJ
sociolinguistic appropriateness of grammatical structures

such as modals.

Hinkel

(1995) also addresses the probl\m

of sociolinguistic application and context. Citing Kasp~r
(1997) Hinkel states, "German students of English are nit
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always aware of modality as a pragmatic category and oftien
translate modal verb meanings from German into English
without accounting for their differing contextual
implication"

(P. 326).

While I concur with the previous theorists and do not

I

wish to minimize their concern, the present study may
\

reflect (pending additional research and demographics) a
more basic challenge for pedagogy:

textbook modal meaning

versus current practical daily usage of modals. If spokeJ
words of commitment such as I will . . . are sometimes
uttered to mean absolute commitment, yet at other times a e
intended to mean relative commitment, which model of
speaker commitment will we set forth to students in the
classroom -

absolute or relative commitment?

In practical

daily application, which will we teach ESL students to
enable them to express their own volition, intentions, and
self-obligated commitments?

How will we teach our student\s

to discriminate whether absolute or relative commitment is
intended by other?
In further pedagogical consideration, we observe that
the semantics of modals differ greatly from other
grammatical structures such as nouns, verbs, articles, and
conjunctions, etc. which have commonly accepted, specific
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and/or dedicated meanings.

If I say the word house, I the

speaker and the hearer as a general rule bear in min\ a
common schemata or definition of the noun.

We know tihat a

house consists of a floor, walls, a roof, window(s), lnd

I

door(s); additionally, we commonly encode that it is a

dwelling place for people (unless specified for dogs lr
birds).

I
Likewise, a verb suggests a particular, defi~ite

.
ac t·ion ors t a t e o f b eing.

1 d'iscrimina
. . t es noluns.
\
An ar t·ice

A conjunction indicates defined co-ordination or
subordination.

On the other hand, modals -- unlike ady

other part of speech -- represent a continuum of degree,
subjectivity and values, speaker intent, circumstance(s),
and consequently, meaning.

modals represent?
grammarian's?

Thus, I ask, Whose continulm do

The speaker's?

The hearer's?

The

Although current grammar texts suggest a

standard continuum for modals, the present research
indicates that respondents employ variant continuums 1)
amongst themselves and 2) with particular disparity to
recent grammar texts.

At this juncture, advocates for a

"textless" TESL classroom foreseeably might use the prelent
research to argue against the accuracy, relevancy, and
therefore, effectiveness of grammar text usage.

However,

before the pendulum is swung far left, I ask, without a
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I

standard of common meaning (such as in grammar texts) ~an
we teach co-operative discourse?

Moreover, I ponder

whether the absence of grammar texts in many classrooms
during the past two and a half decades

18-25) has contributed to the inconsistency of modal
meaning in daily usage and/or in the keeping of
commitments.
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\

(survey age range

APPENDIX A:
SURVEY
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SURVEY
1.

Please rate the following in order of probability
and/or commitment that you would mean when speaking.
(strongest=l, weakest=3.
If any mean the same td
you, please mark them with the same number.)
I can attend the event.
I will attend the event.
I may attend the event.

2.

When saying to your employer, "I will do it," what
do you mean by "I will"?
(Please circle one.)
a. Absolute binding commitment
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do not
arise
c. A probable commitment
d. Other

3.

Which do you prefer to say in daily conversation?
a. I can help you.
b. I could h~lp you.
c. Other

4.

Why do you prefer the above choice?

5.

When saying, "I can help you tomorrow," what do you
mean?
(Please circle one.)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

You can count on my help.
My help is probable.
My help is possible.
I'm considering helping you.
I'm saying this to appe~se·you at the moment, but
I really don't want or intend to help.
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I

I
\

I

6.

When saying to a family member, "I will do it)" what
do you mean by "I will"? (Please circle one.)
a. Absolute binding commitment
1
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do not
arise
c. A probable commitment
d. A possible commitment
e. Other

7.

Please rate the following in order of probability
and/or commitment that you would mean when spe1king.
(strongest=l, weakest=5.
If any mean the same to
you, please rate them with the same number.)
I
I
I
I
I

8.

could attend the event.
should be able to attend the event.
might attend the event.
ought to be able to attend the event.
must attend the event.

When saying to a friend or co-worker, "I will do
it," what do you mean by "I will"?
(Please cir~le
one.)
\
a. Absolute binding commitment
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do not
arise
c. A probable commitment
d. A possible commitment
e. Other
---------------------------'--

9.

The last time that you told your employer that ybu
"needed t_o take time off," what did you mean?
(Please circle one.)
a. Other circumstance(s), such as health or a death,
necessitated time away from the job.
\
b. You desired a break (day off or vacation) from
the job.
\
c. You wanted to go elsewhere (e.g. to a ball game)
d. Other
\

84

10.

When saying, "I could help you tomorrow," what do
you mean?
(Please circle one.)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

You can count on my help.
My help is probable.
My help is possible.
I'm considering helping you.
I'm saying this to appease you at the moment\ but
I really don't want or intend to help.
f. Other

11.

When saying to a casual acquaintance, "I will do
it," what do you mean by "I will"?
a. Absolute binding commitment
b. Commitment, providing other circumstances do nDt
arise
\
c. A probable commitment
\
d.
po s_s_i_b_l_e__c_o_mm_i_·_t_m_e_n_t_______________ \
e. A
Other

12.

Have you in the past year told anyone "I will,"
did not carry out the action? YES/NO
(Please
circle your answer.)

13.

If your answer was YES, to whom did you say "I
\
will," but did not carry out the action?
(Please
circle all that apply.)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Family member
Friend
Acquaintance
Co-worker
Employer
f. Employee

14.

_.>-;

What is the frequency that you tell someone "I
will," but do ~ot carry out the action?
(Please
circle one.)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Never
Rarely
Occasionally
50% of the time
Often (greater than 50% of the time)
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btl\t

15.

16.

What is your age?
Occupation?

-

Sex? Male
or Female
Native language?

Which do you generally prefer to make?
circle one.)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Definite commitments
Tentative commitments
Indefinite commitments
No commitments
Other
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